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1. Introduction
In December, 1996, a new era of the international trade regime started with the first
WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore. Substantial progress has been achieved
in freeing trade in information technology products and a North-South collision on
international labour standards has been averted. However, these successes over-
shadow the apparant stagnation in the area of trade and environment. At last, after
many years of intensive discussions, many had hoped that the first WTO Ministerial
Conference would address this sensitive policy field. Out of the wide range of issues
that can be dealt with under this heading, two figure prominently: trade measures
pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements and eco-labelling schemes. This
note, firstly, tries to explain why exactly these two issues draw most of the atten-
tion of policymakers, and secondly, discusses how these issues can be resolved
against the background of established welfare theory. It also tries to make clear
why the ministers in Singapore pussyfooted around these issues and only decided
that the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment has to continue its explora-
tory work. To come to grisp with these issues, insights from the literature on the
trade-environment interface are first summarized in eight propositions.
2. Propositions on Trade and Environment
Before setting forth the propositions, it is good to know that in analytical studies on
trade and environment, the following distinctions are usually made. First, there are
on the one hand local and national environmental problems, and on the other hand
transboundary, i.e. international and global environmental problems. The former
refer to externalities caused by domestic environmental distortions that do not
expell beyond national borders. The latter refer to environmental problems that
affect welfare both in the home country and in one or more foreign countries,
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the widest scale of course being the globe. These problems are denoted here as
international environmental distortions.
A second important distinction, especially relevant for the policy debate, is
between products, and processes and production methods (PPMs). PPMs concern
the way in which products are manufactured or processed and natural resources are
extracted or harvested. The distinction between products and PPMs goes back to
Articles 1, 3, and 11 of GATT that do not allow unequal treatment of like products,
be it domestic or foreign. Hence, in principle, GATT rules are directed towards
(traded) products and leave PPMs undisturbed. According to the current reading
of the GATT, a country cannot take trade measures against another country on
the basis of PPM differences; in WTO jargon: unilateral measures with an extra-
territorial impact are not allowed. Exceptions are possible for PPMs that directly
influence product characteristics: the so-called product-related PPMs. And finally,
a distinction is often made between large and small countries. This distinction is
common in trade analysis. The difference between large and small countries is that
trade changes of large countries have an effect on the world market, while similar
trade changes of small countries have not.
The welfare effects of environmental policy measures that affect international
trade are, in theory at least, well understood. These insights can be roughly summar-
ized in the following eight propositions.
1. International trade as such cannot be considered a cause of environmental
degradation, but this degradation is rather caused by the absence of appropriate
policies to protect the environment (World Bank 1992). If environmental costs
are adequately internalized by removing domestic and international distortions,
international trade would improve allocative efficiency of environmental goods
among and within countries.
2. For purely domestic environmental distortions in a small coutry the combi-
nation of free trade and standards1 for PPMs and products is optimal, both
from an national and international perspective. Domestic standards setting is
the outcome of an interplay between the domestic availability and quality of
environmental goods, actual environmental pressures and domestic preferences
for environmental quality. In the absence of appropriate domestic environ-
mental policies, international trade interventions designed to offset domestic
environmental distortions will not necessarily increase economic welfare
compared to the free trade situation (Johnson 1966). Thus, trade interven-
tions for environmental purposes are in this case generally second-best. When
no optimal domestic environmental policies are in place, free trade may reduce
welfare (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1995).
3. For purely domestic environmental distortions in a large country, a combi-
nation of an optimum tariff and PPM/product standards is optimal from a
national perspective. The optimum tariff is related to the market power of the
large country, and not to the environmental distortion. If an optimum tariff is
politically not feasible (for instance because of the GATT), governments may
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use environmental policy instruments, e.g. subsidies (Conrad 1993), or (lower)
standards (Kennedy 1994) to capitalize their strategic power. Neither the
optimum tariff nor the alternative environmental policy instruments are Pareto
optimal from an international perspective.
4. For international environmental problems, the small country will have an incen-
tive to “free ride” on the corrections of environmental distortions, and the
resulting environmental benefits, of other countries.
5. For international environmental problems the large country, for the same
reasons as in (3), has an incentive to apply an optimum tariff, which, in this case,
will also depend on the net pollution of other countries. That is, the country
engaging in Cournot behaviour in setting its optimal tariff and environmental
standards, has to take foreign outputs that generate transboundary pollution
into account (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1995). The resulting Nash equilibrium
is not Pareto optimal from an international perspective. If an optimum tariff is
not feasible, the same applies as in (3).
6. Pareto-optimal solutions for international environmental distortions for both
large and small coutries, are solutions that combine free trade and optimum
PPM/product standards in all countries involved. In general, without factor
price equalization and the same technology in production, optimal standards
will not be equal across coutries. Pollution abatement should take place there
where it is cheapest (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1995).
7. Pareto-optimal solutions are not necessarily equitable from an international
perspective, and thus, multilateral environmental agreements that aim at Pareto-
optimal solutions are not necessarily self-enforcing (Barrett 1994).
8. And finally, it is impossible to predict on a priori grounds, that is without
empirical information on the situation at hand, whether the substitution of one
violation of the Pareto optimality condition for another will worsen or improve
welfare (Johnson 1966).
From these propositions it is clear that from an international welfare perspec-
tive, environmental standards will differ between (groups of) countries to correct
for domestic as well as international distortions, compare propositions 2 and 6.
Furthermore, proposition 7 argues that Pareto-optimal solutions are not neces-
sarily equitable and are therefore not necessarily self-enforcing. It is therefore very
well possible that through negotiations (groups of) countries are permitted to have
weaker standards, or that (groups of) countries are allowed more time to comply to
the standard internationally agreed upon. In legal language, the phrase “common
but differentiated responsibilities”, central to Priciple 7 of the Rio Declaration on
the duty to cooperate to preserve the Eath’s natural capital is often used in this
respect. This principle instructs the North to take the lead in the pursuit of sustain-
able development by affording the South a relatively larger share in the use of
the Earth’s natural capital. In economic terms, it will result in a relatively lower
marginal valuation of the environment, and hence standards, in the South. Another
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inference from especially propositions 3, 4 and 5 is that large countries can abuse
their market power, whereas small countries have an incentive to free ride.
Translated into the international policy debate on trade and environment, all
this means that environmental diversity, i.e. cross-country differences in environ-
mental standards and objectives in a free trade context, has to become the guiding
principle. In the eyes of the business community in the North, these differences
cause “unfair” trade as like industries across countries are confronted with different
standards and environmental costs. Also environmentalists often oppose the idea
of “double standards”. Thus, in the international policy arena, representatives of
the North are generally heading for harmonization of environmental standards i.e.
to “level the playing field”. By contrast, countries of the South and countries in
transition fear that if harmonization instead of diversity becomes the internationally
accepted principle, Northern standards will be forced upon them. This would undo
developing countries’ new comparative advantage in environment-intensive prod-
ucts and would thwart their development aspirations. When the generally stricter
Northern standards are imposed on the South, it will result in relatively higher
compliance and transaction costs. The latter cost involves costs for information
and (frequent) adaptations. In any case, the proliferation of (trade-related) envi-
ronmental standards in the North makes world trade complex, less transparent and
hence more costly for exporters. Finally, there is a general distrust in the South for
disguised forms of Northern protectionism, although not necessarily so intended
by the environmental legislation.
This North-South controversy on harmonization versus diversity is at the heart
of the international deliberations on trade and environment. And exactly the
issues of trade measures pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements and
eco-labelling schemes seem to be suitable cases to settle this controversy.
3. Trade Measures Pursuant to Multilateral Environmental Agreements
To be effective, multilateral environmental agreements may need trade provisions
that either affect trade between parties or trade between parties and non-parties.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that parties to an multilateral environmental agree-
ment include trade measures in their implementations strategy that go beyond
trade provisions explicitely authorized by the agreemant, the so-called “further
going measures”. Are these trade provisions legitimate, especially if they address
PPMs in foreign countries? Should these trade provisions not be considered as
the Northern desire to harmonize environmental standards all over the world?
The question is thus whether and when these trade provisions or “further-going
measures” are consistent with the parties’ obligations under the GATT, and whether
the GATT should be amended to accomodate legitimate trade measures pursuant
to multilateral environmental agreements. The question obviously has legal and
political connotations, but here we will only address the economic dimension of
the problem.
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THE OPTIMAL POLICY LEVEL
According to proposition 6, the Pareto optimal solution for international envi-
ronmental distortions is a combination of free trade and PPM/product standards
for all coutries involved. The question then becomes which coutries can be held
responsible for realizing this welfare maximizing combination. From a theoretical
perspective, international coordination of environmental policies has to take place
at the so-called optimal policy level. That is the level beyond which no external-
ities occur anymore (cf Tinbergen 1954). From an environmental point of view,
it is irrelevant whether the externalities cross borders “attached” to some physical
agent, or that they “cross borders” (that is, have a direct impact on the welfare or
utility of foreign nationals) without the help of some physical agent. To illustrate the
various way in which externalities can travel, Verbruggen and Jansen (1995) have
distinguished the following four ways to determine the scale of an environmental
system (cf Siebert 1992, Ch. 10):
1. By the geographical extent of an environmental good or ecological system,
such as a forest, a lake or a wetland;
2. By the pattern of transport of a pollutant: through air, water or soil over short
or long distances;
3. By the pattern of trade flows in case traded products are the media of environ-
mental effects;
4. By psychological spill-overs when, for instance, the degradation of ecosystems
or the treatment of animals in one country or region affect the psychological
well-being of people in another country or region.
The scale of the environmental system, as it can be determined in these four
different ways, indicates the need for cooperation for those countries that constitute
the environmental system if a Pareto-optimal solution is desired. Thus, the spatial
scale of the environmental system and the countries involved, constitute the optimal
policy level.
At that level, policies need to be coordinated or harmonized, which not neces-
sarily means, as already explained, equal standards across (a group of) countries.
What it does imply is that trade measures might be necessary to effectuate policy
coordination at the optimal policy level by concluding multilateral environmental
agreements. These agreements then function as an international environmental
authority or regulator. In order to be efficient and effective three different types
of trade measures pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements are envis-
aged. First, trade measures can be necessary as a complement to PPM/product
standards. Complementary trade measures should then have the same effect on
the international market as PPM/product standards have on the domestic market.
Multilateral environmental agreements legitimize these trade provisions. In certain
cases, second-best trade measures are taken because first-best PPM/product
measures are not (yet) feasible. Think, for instance, of trade regulations and bans
under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
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and Flora (CITES), while no first-best ecosystem management systems are in place
to protect endangered species. Note that according to proposition 8, the effects of
second-best measures cannot be predicted on a priori grounds; they depend on the
particular circumstances of the case at hand. Second, multilateral environmental
agreements may include trade provisions directed towards non-parties to address
the distortion predicted by proposition 4, namely free riding. There is only an inter-
national legal problem in case the non-party is a party to the GATT. In an analysis
of the trade provisions of the Montreal Protocal on the phasing out of CFCs (which
have never been invoked), Barrett has suggested that the credibility of the threat
of trade restrictions was such that, in combination with other factors, free riding
has been successfully prevented (Barrett 1995). In this case, one violation of the
Pareto optimality condition, i.e. a potential restriction on international trade, had
successfully countered another, i.e. free riding, with a positive effect on global
welfare.
To reduce the risk of negative welfare effects indicated in proposition 8 as well
as protectionist abuse, this more coercive type of trade measures should be made
conditional on criteria to ensure that trade is distorted least. Criteria that might
guide their use are: last resort, proportionality, transparency and compensation.
Especially the latter criterion would punish an imprudent application by demanding
compensation for the loss of export opportunities of non-parties, either in the same
sector through technical and financial assistance sufficient to enable compliance
or the equivalence in other sectors. In this way, a price is put on the use of
trade measures directed towards non-parties. This warrants the protection of an
international environmental good at the optimal policy level and might dispel
developing countries’ distrust.
Third, parties to a multilateral environmental agreement may strive for more
stringent standards than agreed upon. These further-going measures, although taken
in line with the objective of a multilateral environmental agreement, are to be
considered as unilateral measures. As such they cannot be Pareto optimal. At best
they can speed up international agreement on stricter measures, but they carry the
risk of economic inefficiency and retaliation.
4. Eco-Labelling
Eco-labelling is increasingly used as an instrument to provide consumers with
environmental information on products on which they can base their consumption
decisions. As such, voluntary eco-labelling schemes do not restrict international
trade, they just provide information to the consumer. The reason for their promi-
nence in the trade and environment debate is that eco-labels may de facto constitute
an unjustifiable technical barrier to trade, especially affecting developing countries’
exports. This has to do with the fact that life-cycle based eco-labels usually address
a combination of both national and international environmental problems, and
that the product cycle or chain is spread over different countries, and hence the
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environmental effects of production, distribution, consumption and waste. A life-
cycle eco-label is granted to a product on the basis of a (weighted) summation of
all environmental impacts during the life-cycle of a product. But who is making
the trade-offs and establishes the weights? The individual consumer will buy the
labelled product if the price difference with the non-labelled product is less than his
or her willingness to pay for the difference between the (weighted) sum of the envi-
ronmental impacts of the labelled and the non-labelled product. This willingness
to pay is based on the consumer’s assessment of the effect of the environmental
impacts on his and her welfare or utility. If the effect of the environmental impact
on utility is independent of its location (that is, if the impacts are truly interna-
tional), than it is perfectly legitimate to compare the environmental impacts of a
domestically produced and an imported product. If, however, the impacts contain
domestic ones where location matters (in terms of the effect on utility), then
the comparison between domestically produced and imported products becomes
blurred.2 The eco-label is a one-dimensional representation of a complex of inter-
national and domestic environmental impacts and thus cannot convey the subtle
differences between domestically produced and imported products. Consumers
may be persuaded to buy more expensive labelled products even though (a part of)
the environmental impacts (being purely foreign) may not have an effect on their
welfare or utility. If this is the case, the information is false. If trade is reduced
because of false information, welfare is reduced and the trade barrrier is certainly
unjustifiable.
Formulated in the international policy setting, the South argues that through
Northern eco-labelling schemes Northern environmental preferences are forced
upon developing country exporters, without taking into account the environmental
circumstances and preferences in exporting countries. This extra-territorial impact
on PPMs is not acceptable for the South.
5. Policy Implications
The reason that trade and environment was hardly discussed in Singapore is prob-
ably due to the fact that it was concluded at forehand that no solutions could
be reached yet. With the sensitive issue of trade and labour standards already on
the agenda, a failure to make progress on the trade and environment issue with a
similar North-South tension would have reflected badly on the Conference, which
was meant to become a success.
The issues therefore are still on the table and they will not disappear by
themselves. On the contrary, without agreement on how to integrate trade and
environmental policies, the liberal trade regime itself may come under stress.
From a welfare-theoretical perspective it is clear that the solutions must come
from international cooperation. Specifically, international cooperation is essen-
tial in addressing international environmental problems and in eco-labelling, as
discussed in this note. It is our view that the international trade regime should
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encourage such international cooperation and therefore accept the results of inter-
national agreements, whether or not trade provisions are a part of the agreement.
The WTO should be flexible enough to accommodate multilateral environmental
agreements, but it should, from a welfare perspective, stand firm against unilateral
efforts to undermine the comparative advantages of environmental diversity.
Notes
1. The cited literature usually refers to taxes-cum-subsidies. Specialized literature on the choice of
policy instruments has shown that various policy instruments may in certain cases be equivalent
(cf. Bohm and Russell 1985). Therefore, we use the more neutral term “standards” in stead of
“taxes-cum-subsidies”.
2. The comparison gets even worse if environmental indicators of the product’s life-cycle are chosen
in such a way that the environmental impact of a given indicator also depends on its location, e.g.
the environmental damage due to acidifying emissions depend on accumlated acid deposition,
soil type, the stock at risk, etc.
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